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the agent. Dewey would say that aesthetic experience is "ex­
pressive" of those settled dispositions. 
It is apparent here how a full understanding of Dewey's 
view of organic unity introduces topics that, traditionally, 
have not been considered especially relevant to aesthetics 
proper. But recent commentators have come to regard this as 
a major source of interest: Virtually the whole of Dewey's 
mature work, and much of what he did earlier, is grounded on 
his wider views about the aesthetics of experience. For this 
Dewey has stretched not just the concept of "aesthetics" but 
also "experience" far beyond its familiar connotations. "Ex­
perience" for Dewey is not simply a phenomenological cate­
gory. The term is a placeholder for the complex of operations 
and apprehensions that occur in what he calls "the interactive 
situation" -which is his way of describing the functional rela­
tionship between the human organism and its environment. 
All perceived qualities themselves emerge from this kind of 
complex, but "pervasive qualities" in particular emerge only 
when the human organism has learned to sustain a certain 
range of responses (emotional as well as cognitive) throughout 
the experiential process. In that case, and in the presence of 
appropriate environmental conditions, the result is a particu­
lar "system"-an assembly of parts connected together so 
that a particular end (consummation) is attained. Dewey's fa­
miliar model here is biological (as in the case of the respira­
tory system of the human body, comprising the lungs and 
their associated vessels and airways). But he extends the reach 
of such a system beyond the boundaries of the organism 
proper, to include not only external elements that temporally 
coexist with the present state of the organism, but also future 
conditions that are created out of tensions internal to that pre­
sent state. Dewey's substantial, and controversial, claim at this 
point seems to be that what emerges from this interaction­
and what constitutes the entire interactive situation as an 
organic unity-is more than simply the "pervasive quality" 
itself: it is also a telic element within the system that orients it 
toward consummatory "equilibrium," for which the agent's 
immediate apprehension of intrinsic pervasive quality func­
tions instrumentally as an orienting clue for conduct. 
So for Dewey, what has organic unity in such cases is not a 
physical artifact but a succession of interrelated events, and a 
physical art object may serve as an occasion not only for con­
summatory satisfaction but for a reinforcement of a specta­
tor's capacity for intelligent conduct in any field of practical 
inquiry. This (Dewey insists) is a central aspect of human life 
that Formalists missed by cordoning off "fine art" from other 
human products, and the fundamental impulse behind Dew­
ey's aesthetics is to "restore the continuity" between art and 
life that prevalent modernist theories had been ignoring. The 
encompassing breadth of the term aesthetic in Dewey is an � 
indication of this. Life has real human value, Dewey would 
say, insofar as it exhibits the organic unity of experience. 
All this places Dewey in an interesting relationship to 
recent developments in aesthetic theory. If we identify 
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"modernism" with Clement Greenberg's view of a "self­
critical tendency" that focuses exclusively on the intrinsic 
properties of the medium, Dewey is not a modernist be­
cause he does not hold that preoccupation with material 
properties, apart from other practical concerns, is even pos­
sible. But if we identify "postmodernism" with the Derrid­
ean rejection of any fixed frame for the artwork that could 
definitively set it apart from "outside" elements, then Dewey 
is no postmodernist either because he holds that experience 
itself does naturally exhibit structures of organic unity that 
define interactive situations. Here, as Richard Shusterman 
has pointed out (1992, pp. 71ff.), the contention between 
Dewey and postmodernism is not over the notion of organic 
unity per se but rather over the priority one should ascribe 
to the experience of aesthetic richness. Dewey takes such 
experience to be of supreme value for human life, and this 
fact he believes should determine our critical interests in art. 
His theory of organic unity is intended to provide a basic 
naturalistic framework for those critical interests. 
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DAVID I. SEIPLE 
Dewey and Art 
Readers sympathetic to John Dewey's philosophy generally 
admire his resistance to the conventional dualisms (e.g., 
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mind and body, cognition and intuition, and subjective and 
objective) of the Western tradition, and often-as Stanley 
Cavell (1990) put it-feel "the thrill of certain moments of 
[his] writing" (p. 14). At the same time, even the most com­
mitted readers find it difficult to parse Dewey's ideas about 
art as expressed in Art as Experience (the book, published in 
1934, revises and expands the William James Lectures he 
delivered at Harvard University in 1931). The challenge re­
sults partly from Dewey's circuitous argumentation, but also 
from his shifting definitions of key terms: "experience," "ex­
pression," "interaction," "medium," and "consummation." 
It is also a consequence of the author's resolve to avoid uti­
lizing normative categories, for instance, beauty, significant 
form, autonomy, truth to nature (mimesis), as criteria of 
aesthetic value. While they had become standard in writing 
on art, over time such categories had, according to Dewey, 
radically undermined our capacity to understand the way 
works of art mean. 
To assess and evaluate the chief claims of Art as Experience, 
even in summary form, is a daunting task. I offer a critical 
discussion of some key terms rooted in Dewey's treatise in 
order to investigate how his aesthetics bears upon certain 
themes that remain crucial for art history and criticism, in­
cluding the nature of an artistic medium, the quality of aes­
thetic experience in production and reception, the relation of 
intention to meaning, and the activity of interpretation. 
The Artistic Medium. Dewey identified continuities 
where others established categorical distinctions. For him, 
the fundamental reciprocity between an organism and an 
environment -in which the organism comes to understand 
himself and what actions and objects mean by testing their 
effectiveness in overcoming obstacles it encounters to its 
growth-provided a model for unifying various divisions 
enacted by the Western tradition. In Art as Experience (1934), 
Dewey states that he aims to "restore [the] continuity be­
tween the refined and intensified forms of experience that 
are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and suffer­
ings that are universally recognized to constitute experi­
ence" (p. 3). 
Even in this preliminary statement, Dewey suggests how 
his theory of art diverges from conventional accounts. 
Charging that traditional aesthetics focuses on the enduring 
product of artistic activity-a somewhat misleading accusa­
tion-Dewey proposes that a "work" of art is not necessarily 
a static object but rather a special kind of dynamic experi­
ence, differing from everyday undertakings by virtue of its 
special refinement or intensificadon. The "delight �f the 
housewife in tending her plants" and the "intelligent me­
chanic engaged in his job" exhibit the raw characteristics of 
the properly aesthetic (Art as Experience, p. 5), but Dewey 
values art specifically because it occasions a beholder's 
apprehension of this special quality. Consequently, he often 
treats the work of art either as a sign of or as a stimulus for 
what he calls "an experience." What distinguishes an experi-
ence from its quotidian analogues is its "consummatory" 
character-its manifestation of a pervasive, qualitative of 
wholeness or completeness and a perfect adjustment of 
means to ends. That fit is not so much cognitively known as 
it is felt by the organism. Its aesthetic dimension can be 
appreciated, though, when the affective satisfaction the ex­
perience affords is subject to reflection. Indeed, "consum­
mation" properly refers only to those moments in which the 
organism's felt integration is complemented by a conscious 
awareness of the qualitative integration it has achieved. 
Careful to avoid categorizing self-reflection as a purely 
intellectual or abstract operation, Dewey explains reflection's 
emergence from an organic setting. Only after a develop­
mental process through which the "live creature" transforms 
its "blind surge[s]" or impulses into "contrived" or orches­
trated undertakings (Art as Experience, p. 59) can the consum­
matory phase of an interaction be consciously recognized. 
This process is crucial to understanding how Dewey thinks an 
individual expresses meaning through an artistic medium. 
Dewey explains how the human being, constituted by 
basic needs and functions no different in kind from those 
common to "animal life below the human scale," is insepa­
rable from an environment that, far from being considered 
external to it, is rather the essential condition of life (Art as 
Experience, p. 18). The animal strives for union and integra­
tion with its environment. Disturbances to this harmony 
create tensions that must be brought into equilibrium 
through vital adaptation. Certainly, balance can simply be 
restored by more or less mechanical means, such as reflexes. 
But in its fullest and most significant form, stability results 
from the "transformation of [mere] interaction into partici­
pation and communication" (p. 22). The drive toward equi­
librium requires-or perhaps we might say permits-the 
conversion of raw material into media of expression: 
Art is thus prefigured in the very processes of living. A bird builds its 
nest and a beaver its dam when internal organic pressures cooperate 
with external materials so the former are fulfilled and the latter are 
transformed in a satisfying culmination . . . .  All deliberation, all con­
scious intent, grows out of things once performed organically 
through the interplay of natural energies .. . .  Art is the living and con­
crete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on 
the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action 
characteristic of the live creature. (Art as Experience) pp. 24-25) 
In this passage, "art" seems to designate processes of pro­
duction that, while they may at first be carried out with 
something like the live animal's absorbed but nonreflective 
involvement in its activity, nonetheless issue in a satisfying 
experience because they become intentionally directed. In 
other words, fu1filling internal drives by transforming external 
materials into media is the route to intentional expression. 
"What makes a material a medium," Dewey writes, "is 
that it is used to express a meaning which is other than that 
which it is in virtue of its bare physical existence" (Art as 
Experience, p. 201). Espousing an idea that is not incom-
mens urate with some views articul�ted by the critic Clement 
Greenberg (and later by Michael Fried), Dewey suggests 
that the "causally conditioned" material of art-its literal­
ness-must be transformed in order to "depict the wide and 
diversified universe of animate and inanimate things" (pp. 
146 and 196). To become a properly artistic medium that 
"operates with full energy" (p. 197), the "contracted, flat, 
uniform" surface of a canvas must be overcome or, as 
Greenberg put it, "re-created." Thus, a medium is estab­
lished not when the artist imprints an inert substance with a 
pre-envisaged form, but when his absorbed attention to, and 
manipulation of, his materials issues in a "consolidated," 
"complete," and "immediate" presentation of meaning (pp. 
56, 58, and 119). Dewey's contention that only a "medium" 
can convey the "immediate," as paradoxical as it sounds, is 
meant to ground his aesthetics in the world, refusing the 
metaphysical concept of art's existence in an ideal realm 
separate from our own. 
Aesthetic Experience in Production and Recep­
tion. Dewey's theory of artistic media bears upon his dual 
effort to ( 1) describe what constitutes aesthetic experience 
for the artist (the producer of works of art) and the viewer 
(the receiver who encounters those works) and to (2) recon­
sider the conventional distinction between aesthetic and 
ordinary experience. 
With respect to the first task, in Dewey's terminology, 
"art" refers to processes of doing or malting (production), 
while "esthetic" refers to the viewer's perception (recep­
tion). Yet he cautions that the distinction cannot be rigidly 
maintained. Both can have a consummatory character. Art 
unites the stages of production and reception, and "the artist 
embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he 
works" (Art as Experience, p. 48). Moreover, perception is 
aesthetic when a "relation to a distinct manner of activity 
qualifies what is perceived" (p. 49). What makes this manner 
of activity distinct is that it is "directed by intent" (p. 48). 
Since the artist "selects, simplifies, clarifies, abridges, and 
condenses" the means at his disposal according to his 
interest, his aesthetic experience is permeated by an "ab­
sorbed" sense of "conserving," "consolidating," and "accru­
ing" meanings from past experience within the context of a 
present directed toward the future (pp. 54 and 56). 
Artists use material not merely to accomplish a set task or 
to effect a predetermined end. Rather, those materials are 
"incorporated" in a special way into the artwork they make 
possible and are transformed into media in the process. 
When means persist in-and are fulfilled by-their end, an 
"integration" of a plastic medium has been achieved. This 
constitutes, for Dewey, an objective standard for value in 
painting. Plastic integration elicits from the beholder of the 
work of art a sense of a correlative integration in her "total 
set of organic responses" (Dewey, "Affective Thought," 
p. 7). The beholder, in order to "lay hold of the full import 
of the work of art," must "go through in [his] own vital pro-
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cesses the processes the artist went through in producing 
the work" (Art as Experience_, p. 325). So, while the experi­
ences of the artist and the viewer are not literally identical, 
the latter is, in a re-creative sense, continuous with the 
former. 
With respect to the second task, we have seen that Dewey 
averts the dilemma of distinguishing between the ordinary 
and the aesthetic by denying that there is a categorical dis­
tinction between them. In normal experience, we apprehend 
the meaning of objects and events by assessing their signifi­
cance against the background of a total situation within 
which we are engaged. The aesthetic, continuous with both 
organic processes as well as with quotidian life, depends 
upon that basic condition for its "raw material," and "issue [ s] 
from [it]" (Art as Experience, pp. 11-12). Thus, the differ­
ence between the ordinary and the aesthetic is one of degree. 
It turns out that what differentiates the process of artistic 
doing or making from everyday activities is the intensity of 
"completeness of living in the experience of making and 
perceiving" (Art as Experience_, p. 26). Artworks exhibit a 
fulfilling wholeness that-while sometimes experienced in 
everyday activity-is intensely concentrated. In contrast to 
the "disorganization" and "compartmentalization" (p. 20) 
of modern, institutional life, art conveys the "immediate 
sensuous experience" (p. 29) of "self-sufficiency" (p. 35). 
Just as it is when we have an experience, in a work of art 
there are no holes, mechanical junctions, [or] dead centers . .. .  In a 
work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into 
unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they 
do so . . . .  This unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the 
entire experience. (Art as Experience) pp. 36-37) 
Dewey singles out the critic Roger Fry to make the point 
that this unity is not merely a formal property of the work of 
art-a matter of perfectly adjusting pictorial elements to 
each other within a compositional whole. Instead, the work 
of art fulfills the "union of sense, need, impulse and action" 
that Dewey identified as the chief motivational drive of the 
live creature (Art as Experience_, p. 25). Yet this quality of 
wholeness evades precise definition. The powerful coher­
ence of aesthetic experience "cannot be described nor even 
be specifically pointed at"; it "can only be felt" (p. 192). 
A total, penetrating quality that is emotionally intuited rather 
than cognitively known, the "undefined pervasive quality" 
of the aesthetic is identical to "the spirit of the work of art" 
(p. 193). As if uncertain himself, Dewey confesses that 
"somehow, the work of art operates to deepen and to raise to 
great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole 
that accompanies every normal experience" (emphasis 
added, p. 195). 
Readers might legitimately press Dewey to illustrate how 
this sense of union is manifested in a particular work of art. 
But the author's main goal-to develop a naturalist account 
of the origin of works of art and to articulate a general theory 
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of aesthetic experience-keeps him from analyzing specific 
artworks in much detail. In any case, his emphasis on the ex­
periential quality of that wholeness mitigates its being found 
as a distinct property of any extant work of art. That coher­
ence, when perceived, is "not the exclusive result of the lines 
and colors" but of the "subtle affinity" between "what the 
beholder brings with him" from prior experiences and the _ 
artwork he views (p. 87). In aesthetic experience, those inter­
ests and attitudes, meanings and values "fuse with the quali­
ties directly presented in the work of art" (pp. 89, 98). 
Here, though, a bifurcation seems to emerge between the 
beholder's experience and the artist's intention with regard 
to meaning-a split that Dewey never sufficiently resolves. 
The viewer brings a prior history to bear in his present ex­
perience of the artwork, and this history definitively shades 
his understanding of what is meaningful to him about the 
work of art. But is what the work of art experienced as 
identical to its meaning?The question would seem central to 
understanding what, for Dewey, constitutes the proper 
domain of interpretation (a subject he never explicitly 
broaches in Art as Experience). But the philosopher hedges 
in answering. On the one hand, he asserts the meaning of 
the work of art is what the artist intended. In the work of art, 
there is a sense of "personally felt emotion guiding the se­
lecting and assembling of the materials presented" (p. 68). It 
is "saturat[ed] with conscious meanings" and a "deliberate 
expression" (p. 23). Form, he argues, is the creator's par­
ticular manner of "envisaging, of feeling, and of presenting 
experienced matter" (p. 1 09). The implication is that it is the 
creator's point of view that a beholder must perceive-and 
interpret-in order to experience aesthetically. A painting 
should not be used as a "spring board for arriving at [extra­
neous but agreeable] sentiments" (p. 113); meaning is not 
"a matter of association and suggestion" (p. 118). The cre­
ator offers a proposal about existence that the viewer is 
asked to judge as credible or not. 
On the other hand, Dewey clearly values the meanings 
attributed to the work of art by the viewer, even going so far 
as to claim that each individual's experience creates a differ­
ent work of art. Thus, he says, no two readers have the same 
experience of a poem: indeed, "a new poem is created by 
every one who reads poetically" (Art as Experience, p. 1 08). 
"It is absurd," he goes on to say, 
to ask what an artist "really" meant by his product: he himself would 
find different meanings in it at different days and hours and in dif­
ferent stages of his own development. If he could be articulate, he 
would say "I meant just that, and that means whatever you or any 
one can honestly, that is in virtue of your own vital experience, get 
out of it. " (Art as Experience, pp. 108-1 09) 
But if it is true that whatever a beholder "get[s] out of it" is 
the work of art's meaning, then it is hard to see how we 
might settle right and wrong claims about what an artist ac­
tually meant. Indeed, there would be no conflicting claims 
as such to adjudicate since a report on experience is not a 
claim about meaning. A report on what one gets out of it 
would not oppose another person's report; rather, it would 
simply differ from it-with no consequences in terms of in­
terpretation. 
Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation. If meaning 
is determined by the contingent experiences of a viewer, that 
condition would seem to obviate the problem of judging 
competing claims about what the work of art means. One 
beholder's experience would just vary from another's. Since 
neither would strictly be interpreting the work of art, no 
basis would exist for agreement or disagreement. But as we 
have seen, Dewey sidesteps the extreme implications of such 
an anti-intentionalist position: art, he writes "is the imme­
diate realization of intent" (p. 85). 
Still, it would be useful to understand better what Dewey 
means by intent, and how it is expressed. Notice that in the 
line just quoted, Dewey does not say "an intent." The latter 
formulation would have particularized intention by locating 
it within an agent and ascribing to him an objective: the ex­
pression of his or her own meaning. Here and in other in­
stances in Art as Experience, Dewey downplays the agency 
that creates the coherence he values in the work of art. (And 
he never goes so far as to say that what is complete about the 
artwork is its having a complete meaning that is fixed by its 
author.) Partly, Dewey's resistance to the idea that meaning 
is determined by the individual is a logical consequence of 
his naturalistic theory of intention, in which an individual's 
"own" meaning is not self-generated (as if autonomously 
created), but rather is the result of a complex series of envi­
ronmental interactions and intersubjective relations. 
In a discussion of experience and expression, Dewey 
offers a comprehensive account of the evolutionary origin 
of conscious intent out of the basic interactions between 
an organism and an environment. To clarify the nature of 
"complete experiences," Dewey distinguishes impulses­
the more or less mechanical reflex reactions of the organism 
to environmental stimuli-from impulsions-the organic 
needs that drive an extroverted "movement of the organism 
in its entirety" toward the world (Art as Experience, p. 58). In 
encountering resistance to the fulfillment of its "blind 
surges," but in successfully transforming those obstacles 
into advantageous conditions, the live creature "becomes 
aware of the intent implicit in its impulsion" (p. 59). "Resist­
ance," Dewey writes, "calls out thought" (p. 60). Insofar as 
the live creature assimilates prior experiences and uses them 
as a resource to confront new obstacles ("reviv[ing]" and 
"re-creat[ing]" them in the process), obstructions become 
the means or media by which the live creature expresses itself. 
This model, however, poses certain difficulties to devel­
oping a coherent theory of artistic meaning. When "sheer 
internal pressure" drives the infant to cry, Dewey says, the 
act cannot properly be understood as expressive (indeed, it 
is not properly an act at all). As he becomes increasingly 
aware of the determinate responses his cry elicits from 
others-and to the degree he begins t.o control his cry in an­
ticipation of its consequences-he "grasps the meaning of 
his act" (Art as Experience, p. 62). Meaning neither preexists 
an interaction, nor is created ex nihilo, but rather always 
emerges within and through an interaction. (The point of 
Dewey's argument, like that of his student and colleague 
George Herbert Mead, is that meaning is not self-determined 
by an isolated, introspective ego, but is continuously socially 
tested and evaluated.) It is only when he grasps how his acts 
effect different results that the child begins to express him­
self. If we extend this argument to the creation of a work of 
art, it would seem to suggest that the artist's meaning is de­
pendent upon the responses he elicits from his beholders or, 
in other words, from how they put the work to use (which is 
the same as saying it is dependent upon their experiences of 
his artwork). 
Furthermore, Dewey's example of the crying child calls 
forth a distinction between an act that, from the point of 
view of an observer, might appear expressive and one that is 
actually or intrinsically expressive. To be genuinely expres­
sive, the "child who has learned the effect his once sponta­
neous act has upon those around him [must) perfor[m] 'on 
purpose' an act that was once blind" (Art as Experience, 
p. 62). The scare quotes around "on purpose" continue to 
indicate the basic problem, and perhaps reveal a certain hes­
itancy on Dewey's part. For if meaning is not determined by 
the child, but is just the name we give to his developing 
capacity to recognize effects, then we have a kind of com­
promised on-purpose-ness. Meaning, instead of being self­
generated, becomes a matter of manipulating one's acts to 
achieve desired effects: 
The child may now cry for a purpose, because he wants attention or 
relief. He may begin to bestow his smiles as inducements or favors. 
There is now art in incipiency. An activity that was " natural"-spon­
taneous and unintended-is transformed because it is undertaken as 
a means to a consciously entertained consequence. 
(Art as Experience, p. 62) 
Dewey goes on to discuss the opposition between true com­
munication (the "artistic") and dissimulation or manipula­
tion (the "artificial" or "artful"). But his discussion raises an 
issue more pertinent than evaluating the relative sincerity or 
fraudulence of an act. The issue has to do with what prop­
erly constitutes interpretation. Although he is far from clear 
on his stance, it is possible that Dewey is saying that inter­
pretation should produce claims about what an agent, 
through her artwork, means. On this reading, we would 
expect Dewey's frank admission that what is being inter­
preted-what we are targeting or making claims about in 
interpretative activity-is what is intended, that is, the art­
ist's meaning, not the artwork's effect on the viewer or the 
viewer's experience. 
However, many of Dewey's examples in Art as Experience 
seem to divide meaning from an artist's intent. We might 
take him just to be suggesting that intent, too, is a social phe-
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nomenon-not prior to or independent of meaning but in a 
relationship of mutual determination to it. To do so would 
constitute a rethinking of intention so that it is not identified 
with an artist's or author's preformed mental plan but as 
something embedded within a community. 
When it has not simply been ignored, Dewey's aesthetics has 
been met with both exaggerated hostility and exaggerated adu­
lation. Benedetto Croce lambasted Dewey in print, but in 1966 
Monroe called Art as Experience "the most valuable work in 
aesthetics in English (and perhaps in any language) so far in 
our century" (Beardsley, 1966, p. 332). What appears to be 
called for-and what some philosophers have begun to under­
take-are thorough analyses of Dewey's key terms that do not 
fall into the circuitousness that characterizes his writing (an in­
tentional strategy employed by Dewey to resist the ossification 
of ideas and values). Michael Kelly, for instance, has recently 
argued that attending to a model like Dewey's might help re­
generate aesthetics by restoring its links to ethical and practical 
life-links that are severed whenever aesthetics asserts its 
judgments as if they are independent of values. With such anal­
yses in hand, a more productive correlation of Dewey's aes­
thetics with the actual history of art-with the conventions and 
constraints that constitute the possibility for an artist's creative 
expression-will be possible. 
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MICHAEL SCHREYACH 
DIALOGICAL ART. Dialogical Art refers to a distinct 
genre within contemporary art practice in which forms of 
dialogue and social exchange play a central role. Examples 
include the work of the Viennese collective WochenKlausur, 
Ala Plastica in Buenos Aires, Park Fiction in Hamburg, and 
Rick Lowe's Project Row Houses inc Houston (Kester, 20 11). 
This work is affiliated with a broader shift toward collabora­
tive and performance-based approaches in contemporary 
art that has been variously labeled "Relational" and ''Partic­
ipatory" (Bourriaud, 1998). The term "dialogical" reflects 
the interest among these artists in a model of aesthetic expe­
rience in which the conventional relationship among artist, 
artwork, and viewer becomes more reciprocal and inter­
active. It also suggests the specific relevance of Mikhail 
Bakhtin's concept of "dialogics" for the interpretation of 
this work. While Bakhtin has exercised a significant influ­
ence in the fields of literary and cultural studies, he has re­
ceived far less attention in the visual arts (Deborah Haynes's 
Bakhtin and the Visual Arts being a significant exception). In 
part this can be attributed to the fact that Bakhtin wrote pri­
marily about literary forms. However, Bakhtin's work, espe­
cially his earlier philosophical research, can contribute much 
to our understanding of contemporary collaborative or par­
ticipatory art practices. 
Dialogical Art practices challenge many of the herme­
neutic conventions of contemporary art criticism and 
theory. These conventions emerged out of the rapproche­
ment between post-Conceptual art practice and Continen­
tal Theory during the 1980s, which led to a reframing of 
formalist models of art criticism associated with figures 
such as Clement Greenberg. We might describe this shift 
as marking a "linguistic turn" in the analysis of contempo­
rary art, due to the important role played by literary theory 
and semiotics, especially evident in the influence of journals 
such as October (Krauss, 1980). Within this new paradigm 
the work of art is understood as analogous to a poetic text, 
"laying bare the device" of meaning through a "de-famil­
iarizing" disruption of the viewer's habitual consciousness 
of the world (Shklovsky, 191 7). The work of the Swiss lin­
guist Ferdinand de Saussure, as presented in Course on 
General Linguistics, played a key role in the propagation of 
this model (Saussure, 1913). It gave additional theoretical 
coherence to an evolving set of beliefs within contempo­
rary art practice in which society was viewed as a vast net­
work of semiotic and ideological regulation that served to 
constrain and determine our individual actions. Within this 
system the only truly unconstrained form of expression 
belongs to the artist, who is able to comprehend this to­
tality, while at the same time devising forms of cognitive 
assault and deconstructive exposition capable of bringing 
others to some awareness of its existence. Because viewers 
in this scenario are understood as receptive and unin­
formed, awaiting enlightenment at the hands of the artist, 
the artist's relationship to them is typically monological 
rather than dialogical. 
Bakhtin was familiar with Saussure's work through his in­
fluence on Russian linguistics during the early twentieth 
century. However, Bakhtin came to a very different set of 
conclusions regarding the relationship between language 
and human consciousness. In fact, Bakhtin was openly crit­
ical of Saussure's decision to focus on the synchronically 
fixed system of language, at the expense of the diachronic 
unfolding of individual speech acts (his famous distinction 
between langue, which is "essential" and parole, which is 
merely "accessory" and "random"). In Bakhtin's view, this 
marked a significant impoverishment of our understanding 
of human creativity (Volosinov, 1929). By refusing to engage 
with the complexity and messiness of actual human dia­
logue ("our pernicious temporality," as Bakhtin describes 
it) Saussure reiterates a longer tradition within modern 
thought that sought to impose abstract theoretical principles 
on the "un-repeatable singularity" of human existence 
(Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 11-13). Here langue becomes the gener­
ative locus of meaning, while individual speech can only 
ever be an epiphenomenal expression of this larger structur­
ing system. Bakhtin associates this outlook with what he 
terms a "monological" understanding of human conscious­
ness, which overlooks the transformative nature of recip­
rocal, inter-subjective experience. In monological thought 
the Other remains "only an object of consciousness," as 
Bakhtin writes. "No response capable of altering everything 
in the world of my consciousness is expected of this other. 
The monologue is accomplished and deaf to the other's re­
sponse: it does not await it and does not grant it any decisive 
force" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293). 
